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Introduction
Recognizing that environmental protection and international trade pol-
icy are inextricably linked, 1 the United States has enacted legislation and
entered into international agreements to protect the environment, utiliz-
ing trade measures to promote conservation. 2 Praised by many
lawmakers as "a cornerstone of U.S. environmental policy, ' 3 the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 ("MMPA") is a notable example of this
legislative approach. 4 Enacted in response to the public outcry over the
slaughter of several species of marine mammals, the MMPA contains
provisions which specifically seek to reduce the number of dolphins
killed by tuna fishing vessels on the high seas. The MMPA regulates the
domestic tuna fishing industry, limiting the number of dolphins Ameri-
can vessels may kill, and requires foreign fleets to meet U.S. standards in
order to export to the U.S. The MMPA utilizes trade policy to enforce
its provisions by mandating the imposition of various embargoes on
imports from non-conforming countries.5
1. The relationship between environmental conservation and trade policy
manifests itself in various forms. International agreements, for example, have long
utilized trade measures to protect endangered species and address transnational pol-
lution problems that threaten the "global commons." In recent years, analyses of
this relationship have increasingly focused on the issue of international competitive-
ness, as countries worry that strict environmental standards at home can disadvan-
tage their domestic industries in the world marketplace. See generally General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade and the Environment, 1 INTERNATIONAL TRADE
90-91, at 19 (1992); 137 CONG. REC. S13169 (1991) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
2. See infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
3. Letter signed by 63 U.S. Senators to President George Bush (October 3,
1991) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
4. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 95-552, 86 Stat. 1027
(codified with amendments at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1362, 1371-1384, 1401-1407 (1988
& Supp. III 1991)).
5. For an analysis of the MMPA, see infra notes 13-33 and accompanying text.
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On August 28 and October 10, 1990, and then again on February
22, 1991, the United States, pursuant to court orders, cited Mexico's
failure to meet the applicable standards for dolphin takings and imposed
embargoes on Mexican yellowfin tuna imports in accordance with the
MMPA. 6 Complaining that these actions violate the liberal trade provi-
sions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), the
international trade agreement to which both the United States and Mex-
ico are parties, Mexico requested that the GATT Council ("Council")
examine the MMPA for possible inconsistencies with GATT provisions. 7
The Council established a dispute settlement panel ("Panel") to con-
sider the complaint.8 After holding meetings with the U.S. and Mexico,
and soliciting views from third parties, the Panel issued its Report
("Panel Report") in which it found the MMPA's embargo provisions to
be inconsistent with the GATT.9
In addition to threatening U.S. dolphin and marine mammal con-
servation policies, the Panel's sweeping opinion puts a host of domestic
laws and international agreements which constitute the backbone of our
environmental protection policies at risk of being GATT-inconsistent. 10
While lawmakers state that the Panel Report heralds the "collision
between domestic environmental and health laws [and international]
trade agreements,"'" interest groups declare that it will "serious[ly]
crippl[e] ... domestic environmental laws" and have a "potentially dis-
astrous impact on international conservation efforts." 12
This Note analyzes the GATT Panel Report, examines its implica-
tions for U.S. environmental policy, and proposes an international con-
servation strategy that would reflect the Panel's concerns and be
consistent with the GATT. Part I addresses the background to the dis-
pute and examines the relevant provisions of the MMPA and the GATT.
Part II discusses the Panel proceedings and examines the conclusions of
the Panel Report as they relate to the MMPA embargo provisions. Part
III examines the current status of the dispute and assesses efforts by the
United States and Mexico to resolve their differences bilaterally. Part IV
6. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna: Report of the Panel, GATT
Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), 30 LL.M. 1594, para. 2.7 [hereinafter Panel Report].
See infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
7. Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 1.1. See infra notes 53-79 and accompanying
text.
8. Id., para. 1.I. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
9. The Panel submitted its conclusions to the parties on August 16, 1991. See
Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 1.3. See infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
11. See GAT: Implications on Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter GA T Implications Hearing] (opening statement of Henry A.
Waxman, Chairman).
12. NAFTA Public Hearings Conclude with Recommendations, Warnings, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1361 (Sept. 18, 1991); Environmental Group Says GATT Tuna
Report Could Have Disastrous Conservation Impact, BNA Int'l Envt. Daily, Sept. 13, 1991,
available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAEND File.
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analyzes the Panel Report's implications for United States policy in
terms of both its domestic laws and international obligations. It also
examines proposals made by both government officials 'and private par-
ties in response to the Panel Report. Part V assesses these current initia-
tives and then proposes an alternative way to address global
environmental problems consistent with the Panel's interpretation of
the GATT.
I. Background
A. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972
Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 with the
stated purpose of protecting "certain species and population stocks of
marine mammals [that] are, or may be, in danger of extinction or deple-
tion as a result of man's activities." 1 3 Such species and population
stocks "should not be permitted to diminish beyond the point at which
they cease to be a significant functioning element in the ecosystem of
which they are a part .... ,,1 The MMPA prohibits the "taking" 15 of
marine mammals except as permitted by the Secretary of Commerce for
certain scientific research or display purposes.' 6 With respect to the
incidental taking of marine mammals by the commercial fishing indus-
try, the MMPA requires that the "incidental kill or incidental serious
injury of marine mammals permitted in the course of commercial fishing
operations be reduced to insignificant levels approaching a zero mortal-
ity and serious injury rate .... ,,17 Accordingly, the MMPA directs the
Secretary of Commerce to regulate the taking of marine mammals "in
accord with sound principles of resource protection and conserva-
tion,"' 18 and authorizes him to issue permits to domestic fishing
operators. 19
In order to effectively meet its conservation goals, the MMPA also
seeks to reduce the taking of marine mammals by foreign fishing vessels.
Accordingly, the MMPA imposes a general moratorium on the importa-
tion of marine mammals and marine mammal products, 20 and requires
the embargo of fish or fish products from exporting countries employ-
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
14. Id
15. "Taking" is defined as "harassment, hunting, capture, killing or attempt
thereof." Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 2.3. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(1) (1988).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (Supp. III 1991).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(3)(A) (1988). The regulations are issued in accordance
with 16 U.S.C.A. § 1373 by the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"). They
are codified at 50 C.F.R. § 216 (1990). For commercial fishing regulations, see 50
C.F.R. § 216.24 (1990).
19. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Permits are issued under
the guidelines and procedures articulated in § 1374.
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Permits for such importation
may be issued, however, at the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce, for display
or research purposes. See 16 U.S.C. § 1374 (1988).
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ing tuna fishing techniques that violate standards articulated in both the
MMPA and its implementing regulations. 21 It instructs the Secretary of
Commerce to solicit information from the exporting country about the
fishing techniques employed by its fleets and their effects on marine
mammal populations to determine whether or not the country satisfies
these requirements. 22
The MMPA contains special provisions protecting dolphins from
yellowfin tuna fishing vessels using purse seine nets23 in what is known
as the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean ("ETP").24 While United States-
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(A) (1988).
23. For reasons unknown to scientists, schools of yellowfin tuna often swim with
herds of dolphins on the high seas. See Margaret Palmer Gordon, Comment, Interna-
tional Aspects of the Tuna-Porpoise Association Phenomenon: How Much Protection for Posei-
don's Sacred Messengers?, 7 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 639, 643 (1977); K. Patrick Conner, The
Conversion of Starkist, S.F. CHRON., June 17, 1990, at 7/Z. Because the dolphins are
mammals and regularly rise to the surface for air, this natural phenomenon allows
fishermen to readily locate schools of tuna. Purse seine fishing is a technique that
enables tuna fishermen to efficiently exploit this phenomenon. After locating a herd
of dolphins, the fishing vessel, using a smaller skiff, encircles it with a nylon net as
long as 3,000 feet. Gordon, supra, at 642. Fishermen often employ helicopters,
speedboats, and even underwater "seal" bombs to "corral" the herd. See Kerry L.
Holland, Exploitation on Porpoise: The Use of Purse Seine Nets by Commercial Tuna Fishermen
in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, 17 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & CoM. 267, 269 (1991).
When encirclement with the net is complete, the vessel draws in cables running
through the bottom of the net, thus "pursing" it and trapping both the dolphin on
the surface and the school of tuna below. The massive nylon webbing is then pulled
on board using giant winches. The dolphins can become tangled in the net underwa-
ter and drown. Sometimes they are crushed or maimed by the gears of the winches.
See Holland, supra, at 268-70; Conner, supra, at 7/Z.
Since purse seine fishing became popular in the early 1960s, commentators esti-
mate that some six million dolphins have been killed. By the 1970s, hundreds of
thousands of dolphins were dying in purse seine nets annually. See Conner, supra, at
7/Z. In 1971, for example, one year before passage of the MMPA, the National
Marine Fisheries Service estimated that the U.S. tuna fleet alone killed more than
310,000 dolphins. Oversight of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972; To Review the
Implementation, Administration, and Enforcement of the Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1975) (statement of Robert W. Schon-
ing, Director, NMFS, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce). Public awareness of the
dolphin killing led Congress to include special provisions protecting dolphins in the
MMPA which was then being drafted primarily in response to the slaughter of harp
seals and whales. See Conner, supra, at 7/Z. See generally Legislation for the Preservation
and Protection of Marine Mammals: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
It should be mentioned that this Note uses the word "dolphin" generally to
include porpoise as well. While the words "dolphin" and "porpoise" are often used
interchangeably, a majority of taxonomists distinguish dolphins (delphinidae) from
porpoise (phococenidae) as different families of cetaceans. See John Warren Kindt, A
Summary of Issues Involving Marine Mammals and Highly Migratory Species, 18 AKRON L.
REV. 1, 5-6 (1984).
24. The association between dolphins and tuna has long been observed in what is
known as the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, defined as the area of the Pacific Ocean
bounded by 40 degrees north latitude, 40 degrees south latitude, 160 degrees west
longitude, and the coasts of North, South, and Central America. See Panel Report,
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based vessels must obtain a permit from the Secretary of Commerce to
operate in the ETP,25 foreign, exporting countries must demonstrate
both that they have undertaken a comprehensive regulatory program to
protect dolphins from commercial fishing operations and that their tuna
fleets' average rates of incidental taking are comparable to that of the
U.S. fleet.2
6
In order to prevent loopholes in a "primary embargo," the MMPA
also bans tuna and tuna products from "intermediary nations" under
what is referred to as the "secondary embargo." 2 7 Under this provision,
added to the MMPA in 1988,28 and as interpreted by the courts, when-
ever the U.S. imposes a primary embargo, other nations that export tuna
and tuna products to the U.S. must certify to the Secretary of Commerce
that they have also banned the importation of these "tainted" goods.
Unless an intermediary nation effects such a ban within sixty days of the
U.S. primary embargo, the Secretary of the Treasury must embargo all
tuna and tuna products from the intermediary nation as well.29
supra note 6, para. 2.3 and 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1990). This is a five to seven million
square mile area of ocean extending from southern California to Chile and extending
west for almost three thousand miles. See Conner, supra note 23, at 7/Z; see also Earth
Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 966 (N.D. Cal. 1990) [hereinafter
Earth Island I].
25. The American Tuna-boat Association currently holds the only such issued
permit, covering all domestic tuna fishing activity in the ETP. See Panel Report, supra
note 6, para. 2.4. Under the terms of the permit, a maximum of 20,500 dolphins may
be taken annually in the ETP. See 50 C.F.R. § 216.24 (1990). The permit applies to
all persons subject to United States jurisdiction and is enforced by the Secretary of
Commerce. See 16 U.S.C. § 1377 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
26. The MMPA requires that exporting countries propound regulations compara-
ble to those of the United States. Specific prohibitions required to be phased in
include: the encirclement of "pure schools" of marine mammals (when there is no
evidence of tuna), the use of purse seine nets after sunset ("sundown sets"), and the
use of large-scale driftnets on the high seas. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I)
(1988). The average rate of incidental taking by foreign harvesting vessels must have
been no more than 2.0 times that of U.S. vessels during the 1989 season, and no
more than 1.25 times greater in 1990. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (1988).
The MMPA and its implementing regulations detail intra-species taking limits and
additional requirements for the Secretary to enforce upon potential exporters of tuna
to the United States. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(III) (1988).
27. See Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, No. C 88 1380 (N.D. Cal. order filed
Jan. 10, 1992) (copy on file with the Cornell International LawJournal), 785 F. Supp. 826
(N.D. Cal. 1992) [hereinafter Earth Island III]. In Earth Island III, the court defined
an "intermediary nation" as "a nation which exports yellowfin tuna or tuna products
to the United States, and which imports yellowfin tuna or tuna products." Id. at 831
(quoting 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1990)).
28. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, sec. 4, § 101(a)(2)(C),
102 Stat. 4755, 4766 (1988) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C)
(Supp. III 1991).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1991). The Secretary of Commerce
must receive notice of the intermediary nation's import ban within 90 days after the
imposition of the U.S. primary embargo. If no proof has been received at this time,
imports from the intermediary nation are to be banned beginning on the 91st day.
Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 2.10.
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B. The Pelly Amendment
Six months after the imposition of either a primary or secondary
embargo, the MMPA requires the Secretary of Commerce to certify this
fact to the President.3 0 This certification triggers the applicability of
Section 8(a) of the Fisherman's Protection Act of 1967, known as the
"Pelly Amendment."'' l The Pelly Amendment grants the President
authority to embargo all fish or wildlife products from the country in
question "for such duration as the President determines appropriate
and to the extent that such prohibition is sanctioned by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."3 2 Although a President has never
imposed an embargo under these provisions, "Pelly certifications and
the threat of sanctions have been effective negotiating and diplomatic
tools." 3 3
C. The Embargo
On August 28, 1990, a United States district court ordered the U.S. gov-
ernment to ban yellowfin tuna imports from all countries for which the
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") had not made the compa-
rability findings needed to measure rates of dolphin takings as required
by the MMPA.3 4 The resulting embargo, imposed on September 6,
1990, affected several countries including Mexico, whose tuna fleet
operates extensively in the ETP.3 5 On September 7, 1990, the NMFS
announced positive comparability findings for Mexico, Venezuela and
Vanuatu, and the United States accordingly rescinded the embargoes
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(D) (Supp. III 1991).
31. Id. The Pelly Amendment is codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1978. See
generally Erin K. Flory, Recent Development, Construing the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments: The D.C. Circuit Harpoons Executive Discretion, 61 WASH. L. REV.
631 (1986).
32. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1988).
33. World Wildlife Fund, History of Pelly Certifications (1992) (copy on file with the
Cornell International Law Journal). Within sixty days after receiving certification of the
MMPA embargo from the Secretary of Commerce, the President must notify Con-
gress of any actions taken under this provision. See 22 U.S.C. § 1978(b) (1988).
34. See Earth Island I, supra note 24, at 969-76. The Earth Island Institute is a San
Francisco-based environmentalist organization. With two other plaintiffs, it moved
for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the United States from importing yellowfin
tuna and tuna products caught in the ETP with purse seine nets unless the NMFS
determined that the rate of dolphin taking by a country's fleet did not exceed 2.0
times that of the U.S. fleet's rate in accordance with 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(2)(B)(ii)(II)
(1988). At issue was the time period for which the comparability findings are made.
Arguing that the MMPA required the comparability findings to be favorable during
"the same period," Earth Island persuaded the court that the MMPA required the
embargo of tuna from any country that does not provide such favorable data at any
one time. Seeid. at 970-71. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (1988) for "same
period" language. The Court ordered an embargo pending such findings. See Earth
Island I, supra note 24, at 970-74. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (1988).
35. See Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1451 (9th Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter Earth Island II]. The other affected countries were Venezuela, Vanuatu,
Panama, and Ecuador. See Panel Report, supra note 6, at para. 2.7.
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against these countries;3 6 the United States also lifted the embargo
against Panama and Ecuador when those countries prohibited their
fleets from setting purse seine nets on dolphins.3 7 On September 17,
1990, Earth Island again applied to the district court for a temporary
restraining order.38 The court granted the application on October 4,
1990, and on October 10 the U.S. reimposed the embargo on Mexico.39
At the U.S. government's request, the district court, on October 19,
1990, converted the temporary restraining order into a preliminary
injunction and the U.S. government appealed.40 On November 14, a
panel of the appeals court granted a government motion, and stayed the
preliminary injunction pending appeal.4 1 On February 22, 1991, the
court lifted the stay and the embargo against Mexico again became oper-
ative.42 On April 11, the appeals court affirmed the district court's
order of October 4, 1990. 4 3 At the time of writing, this embargo
remains in effect.
Six months after the imposition of the February embargo, the Sec-
retary of Commerce, as required by the MMPA, 44 certified this fact to
the President.45 Under the Pelly Amendment, the President was there-
fore authorized to embargo all fish products from Mexico.46 While
some lawmakers encouraged the President to impose additional sanc-
tions, 47 he declined to take such action, citing diplomatic efforts to
36. See Panel Report, supra note 6, at para. 2.7. See also Earth Island II, supra note
35, at 1451. The United States lifted the embargo despite the fact that the NMFS
determined that Mexico had exceeded the limits for both total dolphins killed and
percentage of eastern spinner dolphins killed in 1989. Under a regulation allowing
administrators to "reconsider" embargoes based on data from the first six months of
a year, the NMFS declared that Mexico was within the limits of eastern spinner
dolphin killed during this period. Earth Island II, supra note 35, at 1451.
37. See Panel Report, supra note 6, at para. 2.7.
38. See Earth Island II, supra note 35, at 1451. Earth Island claimed that NMFS
data showed that Mexico had violated the eastern spinner dolphin kill comparability
requirements for 1989, and that under the statute an embargo was required. Id.
39. The district court held that the regulation permitting reconsideration of the
1989 findings, which were based on data from the first six months of 1990, violated
the MMPA. The court reiterated its interpretation of the MMPA as requiring the
comparability finding to be based on a full year's data. Id. The embargo was reim-
posed on October 10, 1990. See Panel Report, supra note 6, at para. 2.7.
40. See Earth Island II, supra note 35, at 1452.
41. Id.
42. See Panel Report, supra note 6, at para. 2.7.
43. See Earth Island II, supra note 35, at 1453.
44. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(D) (Supp. III 1991). See also supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text.
45. Letter from Robert A. Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce, to President
George Bush (Aug. 22, 1991) (copy on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
46. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
47. See Letter from Congressman Billy Tauzin, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries, and Congressman Gerry E. Studds, Chairman, Subcommittee on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, to President George Bush (Oct. 11,
1991) (copy on file with the Cornell International Law Journal). The Congressmen
encouraged the President to ban the importation of Mexican shrimp.
Cornell International Law Journal
resolve the issue amicably. 48
On May 24, 1991, the United States imposed secondary embargoes
on yellowfin tuna products imported from Costa Rica, France, Italy,
Japan, and Panama which were unaccompanied by a declaration that the
tuna was not harvested in the ETP by purse seine vessels of Mexico,
Venezuela, or Vanuatu. 49 Later, on January 31, 1992, the United States
imposed secondary embargoes on fifteen more countries.50 While the
President declined to invoke the Pelly Amendment to prohibit the
importation of all fish and fish products from these countries,5 ' pursu-
ant to court order, the secondary embargoes were broadened to include
all yellowfin tuna imports.52
48. Message to the Congress on the Determination Not To Impose Sanctions
Against Mexico Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 27 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1479 (Oct. 21, 1991) ("After thorough review, I have determined
that, given that an embargo is currently in effect and given the continuing negotia-
tions with Mexico toward an international dolphin conservation program in the east-
ern tropical Pacific Ocean, sanctions will not be imposed against Mexico at this
time.").
49. See Panel Report, supra note 6, at para. 2.11. See also National Marine Fisheries
Service, NOAA, "Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commer-
cial Fishing Operations," 56 Fed. Reg. 26,995 (1991). Court-ordered primary
embargoes against Venezuela and Vanuatu had been in effect since March 26, 1991.
See Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Determination Not To Impose Sanctions
Against Certain Nations Under the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, 28 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 71 (Jan. 10, 1992). The United States removed the primary
embargo against Vanuatu on January 22, 1992. See Marine Mammal Protection Legisla-
tion: Hearing Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1992), [hereinafter Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Legislation Hearing] (prepared statment of Ambassador David Colson, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs.
50. Marine Mammal Protection Legislation Hearing, supra note 49, at 26 (prepared
statement of David Colson). The countries affected were Canada, Columbia, Ecua-
dor, Indonesia, Korea (ROK), Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Sin-
gapore, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, and
Venezuela. The U.S. government has since lifted some of these embargoes. See infra
note 124 and accompanying text. The Administration imposed these embargoes in
compliance with theJanuary 10, 1992 order of the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of California. See Earth Island III, supra note 27.
51. See Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 49. In declining to impose
additional sanctions on Venezuela, Vanuatu, Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan, and
Panama, the President reasoned that embargoes were currently in place and negotia-
tions were being pursued toward a dolphin conservation program in the ETP.
52. The Earth Island Institute brought suit to challenge the U.S. government's
interpretation of the MMPA secondary embargo provisions. The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California determined that the Government's reading of
§ 1371(a)(2)(C) of the MMPA was too restrictive and ordered an embargo on "any
and all yellowfin tuna and tuna products" from an intermediary country unless that
country provides reasonable proof that it has prohibited the importation from pri-
mary countries of the same products which are banned by the United States. Earth
Island III, supra note 27, at 831-35. The Bush Administration said it would appeal
this ruling. See Bush Administration Will Appeal Secondary Tuna Embargo, Notimex Mexi-
can News ServiceJan. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Nevertheless, pur-
suant to this order, the U.S. extended the secondary embargo to cover fish and fish
products from 20 countries.
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D. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The GATT is a legal framework of rules and procedures governing
international trade relations between its contracting parties.53 For the
more than 100 countries that have signed the document,5 4 the GATT's
provisions represent an effort to provide order and stability to interna-
tional commerce. It has worked to achieve this objective through the
promotion of trade liberalizing principles including: most-favored-
nation treatment, national treatment, and the elimination of quantitative
restrictions.
1. General GATT Principles
a. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
As articulated in Article I of the document, "any advantage, favour, priv-
ilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded imme-
diately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other contracting parties." 5 5 Often referred to
as the "cornerstone of the General Agreement,"5 6 this most-favored-
nation principle establishes the general rule that similar trade products
of all the CONTRACTING PARTIES will be treated equally.
b. National Treatment
The CONTRACTING PARTIES recognize that internal taxes, laws, reg-
ulations and requirements can be used as an effective substitute for tariff
protection.5 7 Under Article III, therefore, the products imported from
the territory of one contracting party to another "shall not be subject,
53. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAIT]. In this Note, the
term GATT will be used to refer both to the General Agreement and the organiza-
tion based in Geneva, Switzerland, which oversees and administers it. Parties to the
GAIT are referred to as "contracting parties." Id. art. XXV. Collectively, they are
known as the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Id. The United States became a con-
tracting party by executive agreement, see Protocol of Provisional Application of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, and by proclamation, see Proclamation No.
2761A, 12 Fed. Reg. 8,863, 3 C.F.R. 1945-1948 Comp., p. 139 (1947). Although
Congress has not formally ratified and implemented GAIT, it has acknowledged
U.S. participation through successive legislation. See JEANNE J. GRIMME=r, ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATION AND THE GAIT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 2 n.2 (1991). See
also Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United
States Domestic Law, 26 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 479 (1990); John H. Jackson, The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MIcH. L. REV. 250 (1967).
54. 103 countries are contracting parties to the GAIT. Additionally, 29 coun-
tries apply the General Agreement on a de facto basis. General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter B.I.S.D.],
38th Supp. IX (1992).
55. GAIT, supra note 53, art. I.
56. OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GAIT MULTILATERAL TRADE
SYSTEM 5 (1985).
57. GAIT, supra note 53, art. III:l.
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directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any
kind in excess of those applied directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products."'5 8 The Article does provide, however, for "the applications
of.differential internal transportation charges which are based exclu-
sively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on
the nationality of the product." 59
c. Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
Article XI articulates the general rule prohibiting the use of quantitative
import and export restrictions by a contracting party against products
from, or destined for, another contracting party. It states that:
[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other con-
tracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party." 60
This general rule, however, is tempered by some important exceptions,
such as restrictions on agricultural and fishery imports to stabilize
national agricultural markets. 6 1
Article XIII extends the principle of most-favored-nation treatment
to the administration of permissible quantitative restrictions. According
to its provisions, no such restriction may be applied "unless the impor-
tation of the like product of all third countries or the exportation of the
like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted." 6 2
The Article further provides that the contracting party imposing the
quantitative restrictions should apply them in a manner maintaining the
market shares the various importers or exporters would be expected to
have in the absence of the restrictions. 63
2. General Exceptions
The GATT does articulate several general exceptions to its trade-liber-
alizing principles. Free-trade areas and customs unions, for example,
are permitted under Article XXIV. Likewise, Article XXI provides for
security exceptions. Article XX articulates several public policy excep-
58. Id art. 111:2. It should be noted, however, that customs duties and other bor-
der measures are outside the scope of these provisions and actually are permitted
under Article XXVIII. Although the GATT aims to reduce them, the rationale for
permitting their use is that they are a visible means of protectionism and clearly show
the intent of the parties. See id. art. XXVIII; LONG, supra note 56, at 8, 10.
59. GAIT, supra note 53, art. III:4.
60. Id. art. XI:1.
61. Id. art. XI:2. Other notable exceptions include certain policies designed to
safeguard a country's balance of payments or to promote a particular industry (in a
developing country) in order to raise the country's general standard of living. See id.
arts. XII, XVIII.
62. Id. art. XIII:I.
63. Id. art. XIII:2.
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tions that generally serve to mitigate the prohibition against the use of
quantitative restrictions set forth in Article XI. It states that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a man-
ner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures ...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
Cd) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement;
... [or]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption ... 09
3. Dispute Settlement
The GATT provides mechanisms for the adjustment and resolution of
disputes arising under the General Agreement. 65 While the GATT's
central dispute settlement provisions are found in Article XXII, which
authorizes consultation and conciliation procedures, and Article XXIII,
which provides for formal investigations and rulings, some thirty other
provisions in the document require consultations in specific instances. 66
The CONTRACTING PARTIES have also adopted supplementary rules
and procedures. 67
Article XXII requires that disputing parties give "sympathetic con-
sideration" to each other's complaints or representations concerning
any matter affecting the operation of the GATT. 68 This Article also per-
mits other contracting parties to help the disputing parties reach satis-
factory solutions.6 9
In the event of serious disputes where consultation does not pro-
duce an adequate solution, the GATT provides for a dispute settlement
mechanism. If a contracting party believes that any benefit accruing to it
under the GATT is being "nullified or impaired" or that the attainment
64. Id. art. XX. The laws and regulations referred to in XX(d) include "those
relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under
paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices." Id. art. XX(d).
65. For a critical analysis of the GATT dispute settlement system, see Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for Improvements in the GATT Dispute Settlement System: A
Survey and Comparative Analysis, in FOREIGN TRADE IN THE PRESENT AND A NEw INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 340 (Detlev Chr. Dicke and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds.,
1988). For a historical examination of GATT dispute settlement, see ROBERT E.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1990).
66. See Petersmann, supra note 65, at 341-42.
67. The CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted supplemental dispute settlement
rules and procedures in 1958, 1966, 1979, 1982 and 1984. Id. at 341.
68. GATT, supra note 53, art. XXII.
69. Id.
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of any of GATT's objectives are being "impeded" by the actions of
another contracting party, Article XXIII states that "[t]he CON-
TRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred
to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting
parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the
matter, as appropriate." 70
Under present GATT practice, parties refer their disputes to the
GATT Council, which "is empowered to act for the CONTRACTING
PARTIES," 7 1 and request a dispute settlement panel to hear and rule
on the contested issue.7 2 The Council will then establish a panel of
experts to examine the complaint. 73 To be valid and binding, panel
decisions must be adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The cus-
tomary method of adopting panel reports is through consensus.7 4 A
contracting party, therefore, may seek to "block" a decision by voting
against its adoption. Practical considerations militate against a party's
abuse of this power, however, as other parties may retaliate by blocking
other panel rulings that are favorable to that first party. The GATT
Council can survey the implementation of adopted Panel rulings at the
request of the complaining party. In situations where a country does
not adhere to the recommendations of an adopted panel report, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES may vote to suspend that country's GATT
privileges and obligations. 75
4. Amendments, Side Agreements and Waivers
The GATT provides for the amending of its provisions and for the
adoption of supplementary agreements. Under Article XXX, amend-
ments to Articles I, II, XXIX and XXX itself become effective upon
acceptance by all the contracting parties. Amendments to any other
Articles become effective upon acceptance by two-thirds of the con-
tracting parties. Effective amendments bind all contracting parties. 7 6
70. Id. art. XXIII:2.
71. B.I.S.D., supra note 54, 26th Supp. 215. See also, Petersmann, supra note 65, at
356-57.
72. It is widely accepted that a contracting party has a "right to a [dispute settle-
ment] panel." Petersmann, supra note 65, at 357.
73. See id. at 357-60. For a critical discussion of panel procedures, see id. at 357-
66.
74. Id. at 367-69. Consensus has been the traditional method used to adopt
panel reports, except in some early "exceptional cases." Id. at 367. Some observers
have proposed, however, that the adoption process be defined more clearly. Id. at
369-73. See also JoHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING TmE GATT SYSTEM 56-69 (1990).
75. See Petersmann, supra note 65, at 370-73. Suspension of GATT obligations
would be conducted under the authority of GATT Art. XXIII:2. In the history of the
GATT, however, such a suspension has been authorized in only one dispute. See id.
at 373. See also B.I.S.D., supra note 54, 1st Supp. 32, 62 (1953); 7th Supp. 23 (1959).
76. GATT, supra note 53, art. XXX. Those countries that refuse to accept the
amendments may only remain a member of the GATT with the consent of the other
contracting parties. Otherwise, such a party shall be free to withdraw from the
GATT in accordance with the provisions outlined in Article XXXI. Id.
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As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to amend the GATT.7 7
An alternative for effecting change in the GATT is through so-called
"side agreements." These agreements are negotiated between con-
tracting parties within the context of the GATT. While side agreements
can, by arrangement, be administered by the GATT as well, they only
obligate their signatories. 78 Article XXV permits the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, "[iln exceptional circumstances," to "waive an obligation
imposed upon a contracting party" by the GATT. 79 For contracting
parties unable to successfully amend the GATT, the waiver provision
could possibly allow them to pursue actions otherwise inconsistent with
the GATT.
H. The Panel Report
On January 25, 1991, Mexico requested that the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES establish a dispute resolution panel under Article XXIII:2 to
examine the U.S. embargo of Mexican tuna imports under the MMPA to
determine whether it is consistent with the GATT.80 The GATT Coun-
cil agreed to establish the Panel and announced its formation on March
12.81 For three days in May and June 1991, the Panel held meetings
with the United States and Mexico and entertained presentations from
other interested member countries. 8 2 In its presentation to the Panel,
Mexico argued that the MMPA's primary, secondary, and Pelly Amend-
ment embargo provisions violate the General Agreement. 83 The United
77. "It is generaly considered today almost impossible to amend GATT because
of the stringent vote and procedural requirements, coupled with the wide divergence
of interests among the greatly enlarged membership." JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM
J. DAvEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES MATERI-
ALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 310-11 (1986).
78. Id. at 311. Contracting parties negotiated several "stand alone" side agree-
ments during the GATT Tokyo Round. See id. at 324-32.
79. GATT, supra note 53, art. XXV:5. Motions to waive obligations require a two-
thirds majority that also comprises more than half of the contracting parties. Id.
80. See Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 1.1. Previously, on November 5, 1990,
Mexico had requested consultations with the United States regarding the MMPA
embargo. When these consultations failed to resolve the dispute, Mexico petitioned
the GATT to establish a formal panel to adjudicate the dispute. Id.
81. Id. The three-member panel consisted of Andr-s Szepesi (Chairman) of Hun-
gary, RudolpfRamsauer of Switzerland, and Elbio Rosselli of Uruguay. Id. at 1.2. See
also GA TT Said to Have Upheld Mexican Trade Charge Against United States, UPI, Aug. 23,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
82. The Panel met with representatives from the United States and Mexico on
May 14-15 and June 17, 1991. Australia, the European Community, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Senegal, Thailand and Venezuela made oral presenta-
tions to the Panel on May 15, 1991; Canada and Norway submitted their views to the
Panel in writing. See Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 1.3.
83. See Panel Report, supra note 6, paras. 3.1-3.5. Mexico also challenged the
legality of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act ("DPCIA"), 16 U.S.C.
1385 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 3.3. Beginning
in April 1990, in response to growing public outrage over dolphin taking by tuna
fishing fleets, the three major U.S. tuna sellers decided to only purchase and sell tuna
caught through methods not harmful to dolphins. See Connor, supra note 23, at 7Z.
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States accordingly sought to justify these policies as consistent with
GATT principles.
The Panel issued its findings to the disputing parties on August 16,
1991.8 4 Later, on September 13, after distributing copies to the other
contracting parties, the Panel publicly released its Report.85 The Panel
determined that: 1) the primary embargo of Mexican tuna imports is an
impermissible quantitative restriction; 2) the secondary embargo is also
violative of the GATT; and 3) the Pelly Amendment, by itself, is not
inconsistent with any GATT provisions.
A. The Primary Embargo Is an Impermissible Import Prohibition
1. Quantitative Restriction in Violation of Article XI
The Panel first addressed the question of whether the primary embargo
constitutes an illegal quantitative restriction under Article XI, as argued
by Mexico, or an internal regulation consistent with Article III, as urged
by the United States. The Panel examined the text of Article III and
The DPCIA provides a labeling standard for such products sold in or exported from
the United States. Under the DPCIA, it is a violation of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act of 1914 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 41-58 (1988 & Supp. III 1991))
for a tuna product to be labeled "Dolphin Safe" unless it contains tuna harvested in a
manner in accordance with issued regulations requiring that imported tuna be
accompanied by documentary evidence showing that it was not harvested with purse
seine nets intentionally set upon a herd of dolphin. See Panel Report, supra note 6,
paras. 2.12, 5.42.
Mexico argued that the DPCIA violates Article IX of the GATT which protects
against discriminatory use of marks of origin for imported products. Article IX: 1
states in part that: "Each contracting party shall accord to the products of... other
contracting parties treatment with regard to marking requirements no less favourable
than the treatment accorded to like products of any third country." Alternatively,
Mexico argued that the DPCIA violates the most-favored nation treatment guaran-
teed by Article I, in that it discriminates against countries that fish for tuna in the
ETP. See Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 5.41.
The Panel rejected the Article IX claim on the ground that the DPCIA does not
regulate marks of origin of imported products, but rather the "marking of products
generally." Id The Panel therefore determined that the DPCIA labeling provisions
do not fall under Article IX. Id. With respect to the Article I claim, the Panel
rejected it on the grounds that the DPCIA neither restricts the sale of tuna products
nor discriminates against a country's access to the label. Id. at 5.42. The Panel
emphasized the voluntary nature of the DPCIA. Id. at 5.6. Tuna products bearing
the "Dolphin Safe" label do not receive any special treatment or preference; "(a)ny
advantage ... depends on the free choice by consumers." Id. at 5.42. Likewise, the
Panel found the right of access to the label determined not by the country of origin,
but by the geographical area in which the tuna is harvested. The DPCIA does not
distinguish between Mexican products and those of other countries.
The Panel thus upheld the DPCIA as consistent with the GATT. The remainder of
this Note focuses on the challenges to the MMPA and Pelly Amendment embargo
provisions.
84. See Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 1.3.
85. The Panel distributed its findings to other GATT members on September 3,
1991. See GATT Implications Hearing, supra note 11, at 13 (testimony of Joshua B.
Bolten, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Representative). The
general content of the Report, however, was leaked to the public on August 22, 1991.
See Keith Bradsher, US. Ban on Mexico Tuna Is Overruled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1991, at
Dl.
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determined that "[it] covers only [those] measures applied to imported
products that are of the same nature as those applied to the domestic
products .... ,,86 The Panel accepted Mexico's argument that the
MMPA does not regulate domestically-caught tuna as a product and is
therefore not an internal measure.8 7 The Panel Report therefore
declared the primary embargo provisions to be an import prohibition
inconsistent with Article XI.8 8
2. The Inapplicability of Article XX
The Panel found that Article XX can not justify measures applied
extrajurisdictionally. The Panel further ruled, however, that even if
Article XX could apply to such measures, the MMPA embargo provi-
sions would not satisfy its substantive requirements.
The Panel first found that, in this case, the United States could not
apply Article XX(b) to protect the life or health of humans, animals, or
plants outside its jurisdiction. Likewise, Article XX(g) could not be
applied extraterritorially. The Panel reasoned that contracting parties
are free under the GATT to set their own environmental policies. If the
Article XX exceptions were available for extra-jurisdictional measures,
the Panel feared, a contracting party could establish trade measures
based upon another party's different environmental policies and, in
effect, infringe upon that second country's right to establish its own
environmental programs. For these reasons, the Panel rejected the U.S.
interpretation89
Alternatively, the Panel ruled that the MMPA provisions do not sat-
isfy the substantive requirements that the measures be "necessary,"
under XX(b), or "primarily aimed at conservation," under XX(g). The
Panel noted that a country fishing in the ETP does not necessarily know
the maximum "kill per set" figure with which it must comply to avoid an
embargo until after the fact, when the United States determines the
number based on its own fleet's results. The Panel thus concluded that
the MMPA is based on "unpredictable" factors and is therefore neither
"necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(b) nor "primarily aimed
at conservation" within the meaning of Article XX(g). 90
B. The Secondary Embargo's Inconsistency with GATT
The Panel found the secondary embargo to be GATT-inconsistent for
the same reasons it found the primary embargo to be violative of the
General Agreement. The Panel first designated the secondary embargo
a quantitative restriction and therefore subject to analysis under Article
86. Panel Report, supra note 6, para. 5.11.
87. Id. para. 5.14.
88. Mexico also had argued that the MMPA provisions violate Article XIII. Given
the violation of Article XI, the Panel deemed it unnecessary to examine this other
claim. Id. para. 5.19.
89. Panel Report, supra note 6, paras. 5.27, 5.30-5.32.
90. Id. paras. 5.28, 5.33, 7.1(a).
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XI. It then found that, as with the primary embargo, the secondary
embargo measures represent import restrictions inconsistent with that
Article. As with the primary embargo analysis, Article XX did not
apply.9 '
C. The Pelly Amendment Is GATT Consistent
The Panel reasoned that a measure that can be applied inconsistently
with the GATT, but that is not required to be so applied, is not, on its
face, GATT-inconsistent. In the case of the Pelly Amendment, the Panel
noted that an embargo imposed under its authority is not in effect.
Accordingly, as the Pelly Amendment does not require trade measures
to be taken, it is not inconsistent with the GATT.9 2 If the President had
imposed additional trade measures in accordance with the Pelly Amend-
ment, however, it is expected that the Panel would have ruled these
measures inconsistent with the GATT. Therefore, while the Panel
Report does not implicate the validity of the Pelly Amendment itself, it
does threaten the effectiveness of the Amendment by questioning
whether it can be employed without violating the GATT.
D. Concluding Remarks
The Panel concluded its Report by noting that the GATT imposes mini-
mal restraints on a contracting party's ability to implement domestic
environmental conservation programs. The Panel stated, however, that
to permit the regulation of trade for environmental purposes would
effectively allow a contracting party to "restrict imports of a product
merely because it originates in a country with environmental policies dif-
ferent from its own." 9 3 The Panel concluded that this would defeat the
purpose of the GATT and is therefore unacceptable. The Panel further
suggested that if the CONTRACTING PARTIES wished to "permit
import restrictions in response to differences in environmental policies"
and develop the criteria necessary to do this, it would be best to amend
or supplement the GATT articles rather than re-interpret them.9 4
I. Current Status of the Dispute
The Panel Report must be formally adopted by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to become legally binding upon the United States.9 5 At the
time of writing, the United States and Mexico have requested an indefi-
nite postponement of the GATT vote so that they can work out a mutu-
ally satisfactory resolution to the dispute.96 If and when Mexico puts
91. Id. paras. 5.35-5.40, 7.1(b).
92. Id paras. 5.21, 7.2.
93. Id. para. 6.2.
94. Id. para. 6.3.
95. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
96. See GATT Implications Hearing, supra note 11, at 22 (testimony of Joshua B.
Bolten); Marine Mammal Protection Legislation Hearing, supra note 49, at 27 (prepared
statement of David Colson).
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the Report before the CONTRACTING PARTIES for adoption, the
United States will have the option of blocking it. Many lawmakers,
including a majority of the United States Senate, and environmental
groups have urged President Bush to do so.9 7 The possibility of retalia-
tory actions by other contracting parties counsels against this strategy,
however. 98 Furthermore, as one of the GATT's strongest proponents,
the United States does not want to risk weakening the system by unilat-
erally vetoing a panel report.9 9
On September 24, 1991, in the spirit of reaching a satisfactory
arrangement, Mexican President Salinas announced a ten-step program
to step up the protection of dolphins by Mexican fishermen.100 U.S.
environmentalists, however, called these measures "cosmetic" and
merely an attempt by the two governments to save the proposed North
American Free Trade Agreement.101
On March 3, 1992, the Bush Administration sent Congress a propo-
sal to amend the MMPA. 10 2 The Administration proposed establishing
as U.S. policy the "[promotion of] a five-year moratorium on sets on
dolphins beginning March 1, 1994.103 It further proposed that "the
next two years be dedicated to an intensive research campaign to find an
alternative fishing method for catching large yellowfin tuna that does
not involve sets on dolphins in a truly dolphin-safe manner."1 0 4 The
Administration requested that Congress grant authority to lift any
MMPA embargoes for all countries that formally communicate a com-
mitment: 1) to participate in the dolphin observer and research pro-
grams of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission ("IATTC"); 0 5
2) to continue to reduce dolphin mortalities until the onset of the mora-
torium on March 1, 1994; 3) to initiate a special program to protect east-
ern spinner and coastal spotted dolphins; and 4) to implement a
97. See Letter signed by 63 Senators, supra note 3; Wildlife Group Attacks GATTJor
Overruling U.S. Tuna Ban, Reuters Bus. Rep., Aug. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Busrpt File.
98. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
99. See Jessica Matthews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade; "No Country Can Protect Its
Own Smidgen of Air or Ocean," WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21.
100. Salinas announced, among other things, that foreign observers would be
allowed on all Mexican tuna boats starting in December 1991, and that a new law
would set penalties for killing dolphins. He also declared a $1 million effort to
develop tuna fishing methods that protect against incidental dolphin taking. See,
Juanita Darling, Tuna Turnabout; Mexico Announces a Dolphin Protection Plan, L.A. TiMES,
Sept. 25, 1991, at D6.
101. Id.
102. Review of the Administration's Proposal to Promote Dolphin Protection: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1992) [hereinafter Adminis-
tration Proposal Hearing] (prepared statement of Curtis Bohlen, Assistant Secretary of
State for Oceans, International Environmental, and Scientific Affairs, Dept. of State).
103. Id. at 47 (prepared statement of Curtis Bohlen).
104. Id.
105. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) is an international
research organization established by treaty in 1949. See id. at 74 (prepared statement
of James Joseph, Director, IATTC).
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moratorium for a five-year period beginning March 1, 1994, on all purse
seine encirclements of dolphins except for scientific purposes.1 0 6 In this
context, the Administration stated that it had already secured commit-
ments from Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama to adhere to these
guidelines. 107
Environmental groups and several lawmakers initially opposed the
Administration plan. Claiming that the proposal was motivated by the
desire to "assuage the concerns of the Mexican government,"' 08 oppo-
nents argued that the proposal had "numerous loopholes"' 09 and
"would seriously and substantively weaken the [MMPA] by removing
[its] only true leverage... embargoes." ' 1 0 After months of negotiations
between the Administration, congressional officials, and environmental
groups, however, this proposal was formally introduced before House
and Senate committees in June and July 1992.111 Titled the "Interna-
tional Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992," the House and Senate bills
received strong bipartisan support and a stamp of approval from envi-
ronmental groups. 1 2 The House debated and passed the final version
of its bill on September 24, 1992."13 The Senate passed it on October
8, 1992.114 President Bush signed the bill into law on October 26,
1992.115
In its final form, the International Dolphin Conservation Act
amended the MMPA to prohibit the Secretary of the Treasury from ban-
ning the importation of yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna products from
countries that formally commit to: 1) implementing a five-year morato-
rium, beginning March 1, 1994, on the use of purse seine nets to encir-
106. See id. at 48 (prepared statement of Curtis Bohlen).
107. Id. at 5 (statement of Curtis Bohlen).
108. Testimony of Rep. Barbara Boxer on the Administration's Proposed Amend-
ments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., Mar. 18, 1992
(copy on file with Cornell International Law Journal).
109. Id.
I10. Administration Proposal Hearing, supra note 102, at 347 (prepared statement of
John Fitzgerald, Counsel for Wildlife Policy, Defenders of Wildlife, on behalf of 25
environmental organizations).
111. See Pro-Dolphin Accord Made, N.Y. TIMES,June 16, 1992, at D9; Michael Parrish,
Pact May Stop Dolphin Deaths in Tuna Fishing, L.A. TiMES, June 17, 1992, at Al.
112. The House bill, H.R. 5419, was introduced by Rep. Studds on behalf of him-
self and 49 other sponsors from both parties on June 17, 1992. See H.R. 5419, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The Senate version of the bill, S. 3003, was introduced by
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts on July 22, 1992. During hearings held before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, a representative of a
coalition of 25 environmental groups announced the environmental community's
support for the legislation, stating that "(w]e urge you to enact this legislation imme-
diately and thereby provide the framework for the resolution of a critical issue which
has for so long defied solution." Marine Mammal Protection Legislation Hearing, supra
note 49, at 40 (prepared statement of David C. Phillips, Executive Director, Earth
Island Institute).
113. 138 CONG. REC. H9365 (1992).
114. 138 CONG. REC. S17840 (1992).
115. International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106
Stat. 3425 (1992).
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cle marine mammals during tuna fishing operations; 2) requiring
impartial observers on its tuna purse seine harvesting vessels; and 3)
reducing significantly the dolphin mortality resulting from purse seine
harvesting during the period prior to the moratorium. 11 6 The Act pro-
vides for a re-imposition and extension of embargoes against countries
that have committed to the moratorium and that the Secretaries of Com-
merce and State find to be violating these obligations. The Act requires
the Secretary of Commerce to notify the President and Congress of that
country's violation. Within fifteen days after this notification, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury must ban all yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna prod-
ucts from the violating country. If the country does not certify and
reasonably prove to the Secretary within sixty days that it is complying
with its obligations, the Act requires the President to direct the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to ban 40% of all fish and fish product imports from
the offending country.' 17
The moratorium may not be terminated prematurely, prior to
December 31, 1999, unless the Secretary of Commerce submits to Con-
gress a recommendation to do so and the recommendation is approved
by joint resolution."18 The Act also issues guidelines and provides
funding for an international research effort to develop effective ways to
fish for large yellowfin tuna either without encircling dolphins or by
encircling them with zero mortality.1 1 9 It imposes additional restric-
tions upon the American Tunaboat Association pertaining to permitted
dolphin mortalities and purse seine net setting for the period preceding
the 1994 moratorium, 120 and, effectiveJune 1, 1994, generally prohibits
the sale, purchase or transport in the U.S. of tuna or tuna products that
are not "dolphin safe."' 12 1
Through its negotiations with ETP tuna fishing countries and the
subsequent enactment of the International Dolphin Conservation Act,
the United States may be able to amicably resolve the immediate contro-
versies arising out of the implementation of the MMPA. Indeed, the
need for action was urgent. ByJanuary 31, 1992, the United States Cus-
toms Service was enforcing secondary embargoes against twenty coun-
tries.1 22 At the time President Bush signed the International Dolphin
Conservation Act into law, the United States enforced primary embar-
goes against three countries 12 3 and secondary embargoes against eleven
116. Id. § 305(a).
117. Id. § 305(b).
118. Id. § 302(c).
119. Id. § 303(a).
120. Id. § 306.
121. Id. § 307.
122. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. See also U.S. Enforces Tuna
Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992. at D3.
123. See Marine Mammal Protection Legislation Hearing, supra note 49, at 26-27 (pre-
pared statement of David Colson). These countries were Mexico, Venezuela, and
Columbia. The primary embargo against Vanuatu was lifted on January 22, 1992.
The primary embargo against Columbia was imposed on April 27, 1992. At the time
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countries.1 24 The European Community, some of whose members were
affected by the embargo, protested the U.S. action and issued a new
GATT complaint against the MMPA. 125 On July 14, 1992, the GATT
council granted the EC's request for a panel to consider the secondary
embargoes against Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. 12 6 As
one Administration official remarked, "there is little reason to believe
that the results of a second panel review will differ significantly from the
first. 1 2 7 Additionally, the domestic controversy sparked by the Panel
Report immediately threatened to derail ratification of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement and interrupt negotiations in the GATT
Uruguay Round.' 28
The dispute surrounding the Panel Report, however, exemplifies
the larger, broader problem of the collision between international trade
and environmental policies. The Panel's interpretation of the GATT
provisions effectively hinders the ability of environmentally conscious
countries to pursue international conservation through both unilateral
and multilateral initiatives. The remainder of this Note explores the
possible implications of the Panel Report and proposes ways to address
these concerns.
IV. Analysis
If the Panel Report is adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, it will
become legally binding upon the United States. In this situation, the
U.S. will have the choice of either withdrawing from the GATT or elimi-
nating the MMPA's embargo provisions to conform to the Panel's deci-
sion;' 29 if a contracting party does not comply with an adopted panel
of writing, the United States enforces primary embargoes against four countries:
Mexico, Venezuela, Columbia, and Panama.
124. Id. These countries were Canada, Columbia, Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, Netherland Antilles, Singapore, Spain, and United Kingdom. During 1992,
the U.S. Customs Service lifted secondary embargoes against Ecuador, Indonesia,
Korea (ROK), Marshall Islands, Panama, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Venezuela. Presently, at the time of writing, the U.S. enforces secondary embar-
goes against four countries: Costa Rica, Italy, Japan, and Spain.
125. John Maggs, EC Will Protest US Tuna Embargo Against 20 Nations, J. COM., Feb.
4, 1992, at 314. The EC Commission also requested that Mexico, Venezuela, and
other countries stop encircling yellowfin tuna with purse seine nets. See European
Community Demands End to Dolphin Killings, Notimex Mexican News Service, July 15,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
126. Marine Mammal Protection Legislation Hearing, supra note 49, at 27 (prepared
statement of David Colson).
127. Id.
128. Despite the controversy surrounding the Panel Report, the United States,
Canada, and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement on Decem-
ber 17, 1992. See Keith Bradsher, Bush, Salinas and Mulroney To Sign Trade Pact Dec. 17,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at DI. The effect of the Panel Report on ratification of the
Agreement and on the Uruguay Round remains to be seen.
129. As discussed, the United States, or any other contracting party, could block
adoption of the Panel Report. This action, however, is unlikely. See supra notes 74-
75, 97-99 and accompanying text.
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ruling, the other contracting parties may vote to suspend its GATT obli-
gations.15 0 As one commentator has stated, however, "[t]he GATT
threat to dolphins is only the tip of the iceberg."'' 1 The Panel Report's
interpretation of Article XX and its broad declaration that contracting
parties may not impose their environmental standards on other party
countries through trade measures has sent chills through the conserva-
tion community.13 2 U.S. lawmakers have expressed their dismay over
the Panel's findings, claiming that they relied upon a more liberal inter-
pretation of Article XX when drafting many environmental laws.' 33
This section will analyze the U.S. laws and international obligations
potentially at risk of being GATT-inconsistent given the Panel Report.
First, however, it will examine the Panel's interpretation of Article XX in
previously adjudicated disputes. As one commentator has noted, while
GATT panel adjudications do not have any formal precedential value,
"there can be no doubt that in practice they do to some extent serve as
precedents. In quite a number of panel proceedings, reference is made
to the findings of previous panels."' 3 4 With this in mind, an analysis of
some past panel reports is necessary to ascertain whether similar cases
brought in the future, such as challenges to the U.S. laws and interna-
tional agreements discussed below, would likely receive a similar analy-
sis and be found inconsistent with the GATT.
A. Interpretation of Article XX
The CONTRACTING PARTIES have adopted eight panel reports
involving interpretations of Article XX.13 5 Two of these panels, involv-
ing disputes between the United States and Canada, examined com-
plaints where a contracting party imposed trade restrictions ostensibly
for environmental conservation purposes. In both cases, the party
defending the use of the restrictions invoked Article XX as a justifica-
tion, implicitly claiming that the Article is properly applied extra-
territorially.
1. United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from
Canada
In 1979, Canadian authorities seized several U.S. fishing vessels approx-
imately 50 to 60 miles off their coast for fishing tuna without permission
130. Petersmann, supra note 65, at 370-73.
131. GATT Implications Hearing, supra note 11, at 58 (statement of David Phillips,
executive director of the Earth Island Institute).
132. See supra notes 10-12, 89, 93-94 and accompanying text.
133. See Letter from 63 Senators to President Bush, supra note 3.
134. Jan Klabbers,Jurisprudence in International Trade Law: Article XX of the GATM, 26
J. WORLD TRADE 63, 65 (1992); see also GATT Implications Hearing, supra note 11, at 29
(testimony ofJoshua Bolten).
135. For an analysis of all these decisions and of Article XX(d) in particular, see
Klabbers, supra note 134. See also Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Excep-
tions in GATTArtie XX, 25J. WORLD TRADE 37 (Sept. 1991) (arguing that Article XX
should properly be interpreted to encompass environmental measures).
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from the Canadian Government. At the time, the United States did not
recognize Canada's claim over tuna within 200 miles of their joint bor-
der. As a result of the seizure, the U.S. imposed an import ban on tuna
and tuna products from Canada. 13 6
Canada protested this action to the GATT which established a dis-
pute settlement panel to hear the case. In its report,' 3 7 the panel con-
cluded that the import ban was inconsistent with the Article XI
prohibition against quantitative import restrictions. 138 The United
States, however, argued in the alternative that its action was fully consis-
tent with the public policy exception articulated in Article XX(g).
According to the United States, tuna was an exhaustible resource, the
prohibition was not discriminatory in that similar embargoes had been
imposed against several other countries, the action was taken in con-
junction with other measures restricting domestic production of many of
the items being embargoed, and the measure was related to conserva-
tion of tuna in that it was taken to protect an international management
approach the United States believed necessary to conserve tuna.13 9
Although the panel noted that the embargo "might not necessarily
have been arbitrary or unjustifiable" and that it "should not be consid-
ered to be a disguised restriction on international trade" because the
prohibition was publicly announced, it found that while the U.S.
embargo applied to all types of tuna, the corresponding domestic
restrictions did not. 140 The panel thus concluded that the U.S. action
did not meet the Article XX(g) requirement that restrictions on domes-
tic production and consumption be made in conjunction with an equally
restrictive embargo, and that the import restrictions were therefore
GATT-inconsistent. 141
2. Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon
In 1987, the United States challenged a Canadian requirement that cer-
tain species of salmon and herring caught in Canada be processed
before exportation. Canada claimed that this quantitative export restric-
tion was an integral part of its west coast fisheries conservation regime,
which also consisted of harvest limitations and which had as its goal the
protection of these fisheries. Although the appointed GATT panel
found that the prohibitions violated GATT Article XI, 14 2 Canada
136. The ban was imposed under the authority of § 205 of the Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 1976, codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1825 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991).
137. United States-Prohibition on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from
Canada; Report of the Panel adopted on 22 February 1982 (L/5198), B.I.S.D., supra
note 54, 29th Supp. 91 (1983).
138. Id. at 106-07.
139. Id. at 97-98.
140. Specifically, the panel found that the U.S. did not restrict domestic produc-
tion or consumption of albacore tuna. See id. at 108-09.
141. Id. at 108-09.
142. The panel declared the export requirement to be a quantitative restriction in
violation of Article XI:I. See Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
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argued that they were justifiable under Article XX(g). 143
The panel and the parties agreed that salmon and herring stocks
were "exhaustible natural resources" and that the harvest limitations
were a "restriction on domestic production" within the meaning of Arti-
cle XX(g). 144 The panel next interpreted the meaning of the "relating
to" and "in conjunction with" requirements of XX(g). The panel found
that the purpose of including Article XX(g) in the GATT "was not to
widen the scope for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely
to ensure that the commitments under the General Agreement do not
hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive
natural resources." 145
For these reasons, the panel concluded that a trade measure did not
have to be "necessary or essential" to the protection of such a resource
but rather only "primarily aimed" at its conservation to be considered
"relating to" within the meaning of Article XX(g). 14 6 Likewise, the
panel determined that for the trade restriction to be considered "in con-
junction with" domestic restrictions, it had to be "primarily aimed at
rendering effective these restrictions." 147 Examining the Canadian
restrictions, the panel concluded that the prohibitions were not primar-
ily aimed at the conservation of the fisheries and were therefore GATT-
inconsistent.14 8
3. Conclusions
These cases involved import and export prohibitions justified on envi-
ronmental policy-related grounds. In each case, the appointed panel
struck them down as inconsistent with the GATT and not justifiable
under Article XX. While these restrictions all involved one contracting
party's foisting of its environmental standards on the other party in a
manner similar to that of the United States' MMPA embargo provisions,
none of the panels raised the issue of the extraterritorial application of
Article XX. Instead, the panels held that the imposed restrictions failed
to satisfy the substantive requirements of Articles XX(b) and XX(g). 149
These previous rulings, however, did articulate tests designed to
permit environmental-based restrictions that only minimally affected
Herring and Salmon, Report of the Panel adopted on 22 March 1988 (L/6268),
B.I.S.D., supra note 54, 35th Supp. 98 (1989).
143. Id. at 101.
144. Id. at 113.
145. Id. at 114.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 115.
149. In "United States-Prohibition on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from
Canada," the appointed panel decided the complaint on the failure of the United
States to impose sufficient domestic restrictions as required by GATT Article XX(g)
and did not address the issue of extraterritoriality. In "Canada-Measures Affecting
Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon," the panel found the Canadian export
controls not "primarily aimed" at conservation and did not address any issues of
extraterritoriality. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
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international trade relations. The Panel Report, therefore, departs from
the previous reports by boldly stating that domestic environmental pro-
grams may not infringe upon international trade and that one country
may not unilaterally impose environmental standards on other
countries.
Regardless of whether or not the Panel Report significantly departs
from its predecessors, it clearly illustrates flaws in the GATT system as it
presently exists. As more countries adopt environmental agendas,
instances of collisions between trade and conservation policies will
increase, and the Panel's fear of contracting parties subjugating other
parties' domestic environmental policies to their own may be realized.
The subsequent embracing of the Panel Report in official GATT publi-
cations further leads to the conclusion that the Panel's interpretation
will not become an aberration. 150
B. Ramifications of the Panel Report
The Panel Report's rejection of the United States' invocation of Article
XX to justify the MMPA embargoes jeopardizes the efforts of countries
to protect the environment outside their borders through domestic laws
and international agreements that utilize trade controls.
1. Threatened United States Laws
While the Panel Report focused on the MMPA's tuna embargo provi-
sions, the MMPA requires the United States to embargo fish or fish
products from countries whose fishing industries kill or seriously injure
any species of marine mammal in excess of U.S. standards. 15 1 In addi-
tion to dolphins, MMPA implementing regulations restrict the incidental
taking of whales, seals, sea lions, polar bears, sea otters, walruses, and
other mammals in the pinnipedia class. 152 The Panel Report effectively
destroys the United States' ability to protect marine mammals living
outside its borders.
The Panel Report's conclusion that a country cannot "make access
to [its] own market dependent on the domestic environmental policies
or practices of the exporting country" has the potential to implicate
other U.S. environmental legislation. 153 An analysis of other United
States environmental laws reveals that several of them contain
mandatory or discretionary trade provisions which put them at risk of
150. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 22-24.
151. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
152. See 50 C.F.R. parts 18 and 216 (1992). In accordance with the MMPA, the
United States currently forbids the importation of baby seal skins from Canada and
South Africa. See GATT Implications Hearing, supra note 11, at 59 (testimony of David
Phillips). Also, the Earth Island Institute has initiated court proceedings to require
the Administration to embargo shrimp imports from French Guyana which, it is
alleged, catches the shrimp using means that also trap and kill rare turtles.
153. GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 23. This quotation is taken
from an official GATT document's interpretation of GATT policy following the Panel
Report.
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being violative of the GATT as a result of the Panel's findings. This list
of threatened legislation includes laws considered by many to be the
backbone of U.S. environmental policy. 154
2. Threatened International Agreements
In addition to putting at risk numerous United States laws which unilat-
erally impose trade sanctions on foreign countries, the Panel Report
threatens several international agreements, including some considered
to be the vanguard of future environmental protection. While GATT
doctrine, as reaffirmed by the Panel Report, permits parties to restrict
internal sales of a product and restrict trade in the product as long as the
restrictions do not discriminate on the basis of the product's origin, des-
tination, or process of production,' 5 5 the Panel's prohibition of trade
restrictions through which one country effectively imposes its environ-
mental policies on another can be extended to international agreements
as well. Agreements that subject imports to more rigorous standards
than domestic products risk violating the national treatment provisions
of Article III. Likewise, agreements with trade controls that distinguish
between parties to the agreement and non-parties are at risk of violating
the general prohibition against quantitative restrictions stated in Articles
XI and XIII. 15 6 To justify such measures, parties to these agreements
have often looked to Article XX. Given the Panel Report's restrictive
interpretation of Article XX, however, through which it prohibits its
extraterritorial application, several of these agreements app'ear
indefensible.
A recent GATT-sponsored study of the trade-environment relation-
ship has identified seventeen multilateral environmental agreements
154. In addition to the MMPA, the list of United States legislation whose validity
or effectiveness is threatened by the Panel Report includes: The 1971 Pelly Amend-
ment to The Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988); the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment of 1979 to The Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1821(e)(2) (1988); the Driftnet Impact Monitoring,
Assessment, and Control Act of 1987, 16 U.S.C. § 1822 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); the
Driftnet Act Amendments of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1826 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); the
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1988); certain amendments to
The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1372, 1537-38 (1988 & Supp. III
1991); The African Elephant Conservation Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201-45, at
§§ 4221-22 (1988); and The Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act,
16 U.S.C. § § 620-20j (Supp. III 1991). See GA TT Implications Hearing, supra note 11, at
58-60 (statement of David Phillips); Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S.
Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Deci-
sion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2110-13 (1992); Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consis-
tency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Diftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and
Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 477 (1991).
155. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. See also GATT, Trade and the
Environment, supra note 1, at 22-23.
156. For a discussion of these GATT Articles, see supra notes 57-63 and accompa-
nying text.
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that contain trade provisions. 157 Several of these agreements provide
for the use of trade measures in ways that could discriminate against
products based on their origin, destination, or process of production in
violation of the GATT as interpreted by the Panel Report. The list of
threatened agreements includes several conventions that are interna-
tional in scope and generally considered to be the foundation for mod-
em international conservation:158 the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"), 15 9
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
("Montreal Protocol"), 160 and the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
("Basel Convention").' 6 '
CITES is "probably the single most important agreement now in
existence" for the protection of wildlife. 16 2 At present, 107 countries
are party to the Convention which protects over 20,000 species of plants
and over 500 species of animals. 163 CITES regulates trade in species
that are either threatened with extinction or that may become endan-
gered if conservation efforts to maintain them are not undertaken. 164
This trade is regulated through a system of import and export per-
mits.' 65 CITES requires its signatories to enforce these provisions with-
out consideration for whether or not a particular species' country of
origin or destination is party to the Convention.' 6 6 The extraterritorial
157. See GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 24-25, 45-47. See also
Intqrnational Agreements to Protect the Environment and Wildlife, USITC Pub.
2351, at 5-1 (1991) (hereinafter "USITC Pub.").
158. See GATTery v. Greenery, THE ECONOMIST: A SURVEY OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENT 13 (May 30, 1992). Several regional agreements may also be at risk. See, e.g.,
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific,
Oct. 20, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1453, at art. 3(2). Parties to the Convention are countries
located in the southern Pacific Ocean. Although the United States is not a party to
this Convention, it has passed legislation that complies with its provisions. See
Driftnet Act Amendments of 1990, supra note 154; see also Hurlock, supra note 154, at
2118-20.
159. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinaf-
ter "CITES"]. The United States implemented its obligations under CITES in The
Endangered Species Act of 1973. See supra note 154.
160. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 [hereinafter "Montreal Protocol"].
161. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 (not in force) [hereinaf-
ter "Basel Convention"]. The United States has not ratified the Basel Convention.
At present, only three countries have ratified the document; twenty must sign it
before it can enter into force. See GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at
47.
162. USITC Pub., supra note 157, at 5-29.
163. Id.
164. These species are listed in appendixes to the Convention. See CITES, supra
note 159, apps. I, II, and III.
165. Id. arts. III-V.
166. Id. art. X.
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nature of these provisions call the validity of CITES into question given
the Panel Report.
The Montreal Protocol seeks to reduce the use of certain
chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs") that deplete the ozone layer. In addition
to requiring its signatories to reduce their individual CFC usage, how-
ever, the Montreal Protocol seeks "global compliance." 16 7 Article 4(1)
of the Protocol stipulates that the parties not import any controlled sub-
stances from nonsignatories and Article 4(2) prohibits the export of any
controlled substances to nonsignatories. Article 4(5) requires that the
parties also "discourage" the export to nonsignatories of technology
that can produce or utilize CFCs. And, under Article 4(4), if determined
"feasible," the parties are to ban or restrict the importation from non-
signatories of products produced with controlled CFCs.16 8 The coercive
nature of these extraterritorial provisions puts the Protocol at risk of
violating the GATT in the wake of the Panel Report.
The objective of the Basel Convention is to limit the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes among party countries and to ensure
that all such waste is disposed of in an environmentally sound man-
ner.' 6 9 To these ends, the Convention grants its parties the right to
prohibit the importation of hazardous waste; exporting parties must
secure written permission from the importing country before transport-
ing the material.' 70 Both the exporting and importing countries must
ensure that the wastes to be transported will be managed and disposed
of in an environmentally sound manner.1 7 1 Generally, transport of haz-
ardous waste is to occur only when the exporting party does not have
the means to properly dispose of the materials, or when the importing
party has a legitimate need for the materials.' 72 In order to best achieve
the Convention's objectives, article 4(5) prohibits parties from import-
ing waste from, or exporting waste to, non-parties. 17 3 Because this
trade restriction discriminates against non-parties based on the origin or
destination of the hazardous waste, this provision seemingly violates the
GATT as interpreted by the Panel Report.
C. Reactions and Proposals
Lawmakers and critics were quick to address the Panel Report's implica-
tions. Looking beyond the immediate efforts to resolve the tuna issue
through bilateral negotiations and legislation, 174 Congress held hear-
ings to discuss the Panel Report and to examine ways to protect
167. Lori B. Talbot, Comment, Recent Developments in the Aontreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: The June 1990 Meeting and Beyond, 26 INT'L LAW. 145,
160 (1992).
168. Montreal Protocol, supra note 160, art. 4, 26 I.L.M. at 1554-55.
169. See Basel Convention, supra note 161, pmbl., 28 I.L.M. 657-59.
170. Id. arts. 4(1), 5, 28 I.L.M. 661, 664.
171. Id. arts. 4(8), 8, 28 I.L.M. 663, 666.
172. Id. art. 4(9).
173. Id. art. 4(5), 28 I.L.M. 662.
174. See supra notes 100-21 and accompanying text.
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threatened U.S. environmental laws and interests given the Panel's
interpretation of the GATT.1 75 As a result, both congressional and pri-
vate interest groups have set forth proposals to address this larger issue.
1. Congressional Proposals
a. House of Representatives
Following Committee hearings in September 1991,176 representatives
forwarded two different resolutions to the Ways and Means Committee
for consideration. On November 21, 1991, twenty six representatives
submitted a resolution which:
calls upon the President to initiate and complete negotiations, as part of
the current Uruguay Round GATT talk, to make the GATT compatible
with the [MMPA] and other United States health, safety, labor, and envi-
ronmental laws, including those laws that are designed to protect the
environment outside the geographic borders of the United States.1 77
The Resolution further states that: "The Congress will not approve leg-
islation to implement any trade agreement (including the Uruguay
Round of the GATT and the United States-Mexico Free Trade Agree-
ment) if such agreement jeopardizes United States health, safety, labor,
or environmental laws. .... ,1'78 The House passed this resolution on
August 6, 1992.
On April 30, 1991, members of the Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries proposed a separate amendment to the Fisherman's Pro-
tective Act of 1967179 to require the president to actively address envi-
roioumental issues in the international arena. Declaring it to be "the
policy of Congress that the United States shall address environmental
issues during multilateral, bilateral and regional trade negotiations,"' 8 0
the proposal stated that:
In implementing [this] policy .... the President shall direct the United
States Trade Representative to actively seek to-
(2) reform articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
... to take into consideration the national environmental laws of the con-
tracting parties and international environmental treaties; [and]
(3) secure a working party on trade and the environment within
GATT as soon as possible .... 18 1
The proposal sought to strengthen the Pelly Amendment by broadening
the authority of the president to impose additional sanctions on embar-
goed parties; it expanded the scope of a permissible Pelly embargo from
permitting the embargo of fish and wildlife products to allowing for the
175. See Gait Implications Hearing, supra note 11.
176. See id.
177. H. Con. Res. 246, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) Sec. 1.
178. Id., Sec. 2.
179. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
180. P.L. 102-582, 106 Stat. 4900, Sec. 203 (1992).
181. Id.
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embargo of "any product."18 2 This bill passed the House and Senate,
and President Bush signed it into law on November 2, 1992.
b. Senate
The Senate has also been active in addressing the ramifications of the
Panel Report. On October 3, 1991, 63 Senators sent a letter to Presi-
dent Bush expressing "great concern" over the ruling and its potential
effect on environmental conservation policy.1 83 The Senators urged the
President to block adoption of the Report "for an appropriate time,"
consider pursuing international agreements to achieve the objectives of
the MMPA, and work with the other contracting parties "to ensure that
the GATT fully recognizes the legitimate objectives of protecting the
environment .. ".. ,184 Two Senators have further addressed the
broader issue of the collision between trade and the environment in the
time following the establishment of the GATT Panel.
1) International Pollution Deterrence Act
Senator David Boren introduced the "International Pollution Deter-
rence Act of 1991" to the Committee on Finance in April 1991.185
Designed to "help U.S. companies compete with foreign manufacturers
that do not meet adequate environmental standards [and] encourage
polluting countries to enact more stringent pollution control meas-
ures,"186 the proposed bill would amend the Tariff Act of 1930187 to
impose countervailing duties on imports that are produced without
"effective pollution controls and environmental safeguards," as deter-
mined by U.S. law and as applied to domestic producers.18 TAe
amount of the countervailing duty would be based on "the cost which
would have to be incurred by the manufacturer of [sic] producer of the
foreign articles of merchandise to comply with environmental standards
imposed on United States producers of the same class or kind of mer-
chandise." 189 Under the amended Tariff Act of 1930, these duties
would be determined by the United States International Trade Commis-
sion and administered by the Secretary of the Treasury.190
Under the proposed bill, proceeds from the duties would go to two
funds. Fifty percent of the monies would go to a "Pollution Control
Research & Development Fund" which would be administered by the
182. Id. at Sec. 201. For discussion of current Pelly Amendment provisions, see
supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
183. Letter from 63 Senators to President Bush, supra note 3.
184. Id.
185. S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991).
186. International Trade, Boren Bill Would Impose Duties Linked to Environmental Stan-
dards, BNA Daily Report for Executives, April 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, DREXEC File.
187. Codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1202-1700 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
188. S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991).
189. Id.
190. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(d),(e), 1677 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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Environmental Protection Agency and would be used to assist U.S. com-
panies develop pollution control technology and equipment. 19 1 The
other fifty percent of the proceeds would go to a "Pollution Control
Equipment Export Fund," to be administered by the Agency for Inter-
national Development, which would assist less developed countries
("LDCs") purchase U.S. pollution control equipment.' 9 2 The Senate
Subcommittee on International Trade held hearings on S. 984 on Octo-
ber 25, 1991, but has not taken any further action.
2) GATT Environmental Code
Taking a different approach, Senator Max Baucus would work within the
GATT to negotiate a side agreement that would account for environ-
mental issues. Senator Baucus has proposed the drafting of a GATT
Environment Code' 93 that would be modeled on the current GATT
Subsidies Code. 194 Baucus envisions an agreement that would permit
each party to set its own environmental protection standards. If
imported products were found not to meet the importing country's stan-
dards, duties could be applied if three criteria were satisfied:
First, the environmental protection standards applied must have a sound
scientific basis.
Second, the same standards must be applied to all competitive domestic
production.
And, finally, the imported products must be causing economic injury to
competitive domestic production. 195
Under Senator Baucus' proposal, a country could set the import duties
at a "level sufficient to offset any economic advantage gained [by the
exporting country] by producing the product under less stringent envi-
ronmental protection regulations."'196 A dispute settlement panel
would hear and resolve complaints arising out of the application of these
provisions. 197
2. Interest Group Proposals
In the congressional hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Com-
191. S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1991).
192. Id
193. Senator Baucus has called for the negotiation of a GATT Environmental
Code in several fora. See 137 CONG. REC. S13169 (Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Baucus); Baucus Calls for Environmental Code in GATT Modeled After Subsidies Code, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1568 (Oct. 30, 1991); Senator Max Baucus, New Trade
Initiative Linking Environmental Issues to Trade Negotiations, Luncheon Address to
the Institute for International Economics (Oct. 30, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library.
194. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, B.I.S.D. supra note 54, 26th Supp.
56 (1980) [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
195. 137 CONG. REC. S13169 (Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
196. Id.
197. Id.
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merce, various environmental interest groups testified, uniformly
requesting that Congress call for structural changes in the GATT to per-
mit contracting parties to promulgate environmental laws with extrater-
ritorial effect. David Phillips, of the Earth Island Institute, testified on
behalf of fifteen organizations. He stated that:
[in] our view, nothing short of GATT reform is acceptable.... [We urge]
Congress to press for full rejection of the [Panel Report] and to seek fun-
damental reforms which will ensure the rights of GATT Contracting Par-
ties to take trade actions consistent with the protection of the global
resources and recognizing the validity of worldwide environmental
treaties. 198
Consumer advocate Ralph Nader similarly requested the Commit-
tee to reject any GATT or free trade agreement that might threaten U.S.
environmental standards, to refuse any Administration request to
amend the MMPA so to conform it with the Panel ruling, and to seek
reform of the system by which GATT and other trade agreements are
negotiated. 199 Another Committee witness suggested that Congress
seek to amend the GATT to permit national governments to assert their
"sovereign prerogative [of doing] what they believe is necessary in the
public interest to protect the environment and conserve resources."200
This witness articulated a model for a proposed article.
2 0
198. GATT Implications Hearings, supra note 11, at 62.
199. Id. at 73-74.
200. Id. at 95 (testimony of Steven Shrybman, Canadian Environmental Law
Assn.).
201. See id. at 90. The proposed article reads:
1. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent any party from
taking any action which it may deem necessary to protect the environ-
ment, including the establishment of import or export restrictions and
the use of subsidies to:
(i) prevent or remedy adverse environmental effects, and/or;
(ii) conserve natural resources;
2. For greater certainty, "actions necessary to protect the environment"
shall include national and international initiatives, including, but not
restricted to:
(i) the establishment of regulatory regimes including environmental
standards, objectives, guidelines and codes of practice;
(ii) approval processes relating to environmental impact assessment of
projects or programs that may have significant environmental con-
sequences, including the determination of whether approval for
such projects or programs shall be granted;
(iii) measures intended to encourage public participation and standing
in the decision-making processes that may affect the environment,
and;
(iv) access to information on matters relating to the environment
3. For the purpose of resolving or adjudicating any dispute that may arise
under this agreement with respect to any action taken to protect the envi-
ronment, the onus shall be upon the complainant to prove that:
(i) the action or measure was not taken in good faith, and;
(ii) is unreasonable.
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V. Proposal
The world community must recognize that, as evidenced by the Panel
Report, the GATT cannot adequately address the growing international
concern over environmental problems. 20 2 The CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES must update and modernize the GATT system to address environ-
mental realities. In forging new proposals, however, draftsmen must
carefully balance the twin goals of free trade and environmental protec-
tion. The world trading community must resolve to maintain and con-
tinue the economic stability and growth that the GATT has facilitated
since the Second World War. 20 3 Efforts to protect the environment
must not be allowed to degenerate into non-tariff barriers and protec-
tionism, the fear of which figured prominently in the Panel Report. The
world trading community must also strike a balance between the respon-
sibility of the world citizenry to protect its global commons and the right
of sovereign states to seek to improve their standards of living by indus-
trializing as efficiently as possible. 20 4
A. Assessment of Current Proposals
The proposals articulated by congressional and interest groups to
address the ramifications of the Panel Report, unfortunately, fail to ade-
202. The international community, in recent years, has acknowledged the critical
levels of environmental problems and resolved to confront them. See, e.g., Economic
Declaration of the G-7 London Summit, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) para. 52 (July 26,
1991), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File; Paul Lewis, Environmental Aid for
Poor Nations Agreed at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, at Al. In addition, the
United Nations held an environmental summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to
discuss environmental issues on June 3-14, 1992.
203. The GATT is generally credited with helping to "buil[d] the prosperity that
much of the world now takes for granted." GATT will build America, THE ECONOMIST,
June 27, 1992, at 13.
204. Lesser developed countries ("LDCs") argue that they cannot afford to indus-
trialize with environmentally friendly equipment and processes. Instead, they accuse
the industrialized countries as already having reaped the economic rewards of pollut-
ing and demand that these countries assist them monetarily and otherwise in any
conservation efforts. See Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, Environmental Law:
International Trade, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 1992, at 29. In recent years, this argument has
proved somewhat persuasive. At the U.N. Rio dejaneiro environmental summit, for
example, industrialized countries pledged themselves to help LDCs develop in an
environmentally conscious manner. See Lewis, supra note 202, at Al. Indeed, indus-
trialized and environmentally conscious countries have already put this proposal into
practice. In the Montreal Protocol, industrialized nations agreed to create a fund to
help finance purchases by LDCs of modern, environmentally friendly equipment. See
Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991); Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 541. For a critical
analysis of the Protocol's funding mechanism, see Jason M. Patlis, Note, The Multilat-
eral Fund of the Montreal Protocol: A Prototype for Financial Mechanisms in Protecting the
Global Environment, 25 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 181 (1992). The United States also used
this financial assistance approach in its negotiations to resolve the tuna dispute, see
supra note 119 and accompanying text, and the press has suggested it could be a
feasible solution to prevent the feared resumption of commercial whaling. See Sell the
Whale, THE ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 16.
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quately balance these concerns. Several of the proposals, as discussed
above, demand that the United States seek reforms in the GATT to
make it compatible with the MMPA and other U.S. environmental laws.
Although these resolutions are somewhat difficult to evaluate for their
lack of specificity, their general insistence that the international commu-
nity accept the extraterritorial application of national (and, in particular,
U.S.) standards make these proposals unworkable. 205 The United States
currently expends approximately $120 billion a year on environmental
protection. This figure is expected to rise to approximately $180 billion
annually, or 2.8%o of the GDP, by the year 2000.206 LDCs will surely
claim a financial inability to meet such high standards in rejecting these
proposals.
Three more specifically-stated proposals deserve closer attention.
In their present forms, however, they too lack the necessary ingredients
for feasible, successful GATT reform. The GATT amendment pro-
posed by one witness during the September 1991 congressional hear-
ings, 20 7 for example, fails to sufficiently balance the twin concerns of
protecting the environment and promoting international development.
Although it seeks a standard of fairness by sanctioning only "reason-
able" and "good faith" environmental-based import restrictions, these
criteria are simply too imprecise to be acceptable to LDCs. Although a
GATT dispute settlement panel would presumably resolve disputes aris-
ing under the amendment, this imprecision would impose an aura of
uncertainty on the world trading system.
Senator Boren's International Pollution Deterrence Act would
declare pollution an impermissible subsidy under the Tariff Act and
require the unilateral imposition of countervailing duties on imports
from countries whose production processes do not satisfy U.S. environ-
mental standards.208 Such provisions most certainly would not garner
sufficient support from contracting parties. Although the legislation
would commit 50% of the collected duties to help LDCs purchase envi-
ronmentally friendly equipment, many contracting parties would
undoubtedly protest and reject the imposition of U.S. standards as an
international bench mark, the mechanism by which the other 50% of
205. See supra notes 177-82, 198-99 and accompanying text. While these proposals
do not indicate specifically how they will attain these reforms, it is evident that GATT
contracting parties, especially LDCs, would not accept them because of their eleva-
tion of countries' domestic standards to the international level. House Resolution
246, for example, "calls upon the President... to make the GATT compatible with
the [MMPA and other U.S. environmental laws] .... Public Law 102-582 likewise
directs the President to "reform [the GATT] to take into consideration ... national
environmental laws." The Earth Island and Ralph Nader approaches also demand
that the GATT be reformed to respect national (or at least U.S.) environmental stan-
dards. In an international trading system, however, nations' standards are not uni-
form; it is safe to say that contracting parties will not agree to subject their national
interests to the standards of another party.
206. Faye Rice, Next Steps for the Environment, FORrUNE, Oct. 19, 1992, at 98.
207. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
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tariff proceeds would support U.S. industry research and development,
and the requirement that they use the returned funds to purchase only
U.S. equipment.
Senator Baucus would negotiate an Environmental Code as a side
agreement to the GATT, similar to the current GATT Subsidies
Code. 20 9 The proposed Environmental Code would permit each coun-
try to set and enforce its own standards, so long as they are grounded in
"sound scientific data." Unlike the proposed GATT amendment dis-
cussed above, the Environmental Code would eschew issues of "reason-
ableness" and "good faith" in favor of a standard for which scientists
can presumably articulate acceptable tests and guidelines up front. In
theory, this proposal would effectively address the twin goals of free
trade and environmental protection; it would not sacrifice the liberal
trading regime that the GATT has worked to establish, while it would
motivate all parties to raise their individual environmental standards. In
its present form, however, the proposed Code may well fall victim to the
same protests that would preclude implementation of other proposals.
LDCs will fight it because it would hinder their ability to compete
against developed countries when duties are levied against their
products.
While the proposal's assertion that a country's lower environmental
standards can effectively subsidize its industries in competition with
industries of countries with higher environmental standards is correct,
equating this type of subsidization with the kinds addressed by the Sub-
sidies Code is not accurate. The purpose of the GATT Subsidies Code
is to level the trade playing field by counteracting the financial assistance
given by a government to a corporation or industry; the Subsidies Code
thus presumes that the subsidizing government has the financial
resources to assist its industries. In the case of "environmental subsi-
dies," however, it is not "positive" government assistance that is
targeted but rather the lack of regulations that would negatively affect
the competitiveness of the industry in question. Absent from the Envi-
ronmental Code's equation is the issue of a country's national resources
and ability to afford the costs of implementing higher environmental
standards. The question arises whether it is fair and equitable to penal-
ize countries for having lower standards when it is possible that they do
not have the economic means to impose higher ones. LDCs will argue
that it is not and will work to defeat the proposal.
B. Environmental Standards, Pollution Allowances & Allowance
Trading
This author proposes that the CONTRACTING PARTIES, working
within GATT to either amend the General Agreement or negotiate side
agreements, undertake a two-prong initiative to address the environ-
mental deficiencies of the GATT as revealed by the Panel Report. Con-
209. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
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tracting parties should first seek to establish environmental standards
for as many activities and processes as is feasible. For those activities for
which no standards can be agreed upon, the parties should set targets
for international reductions in environmentally unsound activities and
establish a system featuring tradeable "pollution allowances" to achieve
these goals.
1. Environmental Standards
The negotiation of international environmental standards is an essential
first step toward satisfying the dual concerns of protecting the environ-
ment and encouraging international economic development. Environ-
mental standards have already been successfully negotiated in areas
such as endangered species-evidence that negotiators can reach agree-
ment on standards through compromise and innovative solutions. In
the CITES agreement, for example, parties pledged to prohibit or
restrict trade in up to 20,000 plant and 500 animal species. 2 10
In some situations, where parties could not agree upon standards,
negotiators have engineered innovative solutions to resolve the dead-
lock. In the U.S.-Mexico tuna dispute, for example, impasse resulted
from Mexico's position that its tuna fishing industry could not afford the
equipment necessary to meet the high dolphin taking standards pro-
posed by the U.S. In its attempts to resolve the dispute, the United
States has indicated its willingness to contribute to a fund to aid tuna
fishing research. 2 1I Negotiators of the Montreal Protocol also utilized a
funding mechanism to entice LDCs to join the agreeement.2 12 Some
observers believe a similar approach could help resolve a current con-
troversy involving whaling.21 3
The CONTRACTING PARTIES should aggressively negotiate
international environmental standards where it is possible to convince
LDCs to adopt newer production methods and, if necessary and feasible,
establish funding mechanisms to aid LDCs in these endeavors.
2. Pollution Allowances and Allowance Trading
Efforts to negotiate environmental standards, however, even if pursued
aggressively, will not resolve some of our most pressing environmental
problems. This author, therefore, further proposes the establishment of
an international system of tradeable pollution allowances as a means of
regulating and reducing environmentally unsound activities. The
notion of such an allowance system is not novel. Academics first articu-
lated the idea of controlling pollutants through free-market principles in
the early 1900s. 2 14 The United States Environmental Protection
210. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Patlis, supra note 204.
213. See Sell the whale, THE ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 16.
214. SeeJeffrey Taylor, Smog Swapping: New Rules Harness Power of Free Markets to Curb
Air Pollution, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 14, 1992, at Al.
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Agency began implementing "pollution market" programs in the
1970s.2 15 The United States expanded upon these programs with
amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1990.216
a. Clean Air Act Amendments
Considered "the centerpiece of the Bush Administration's acid rain pro-
posal," 2 17 the allowance trading provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments seek to reduce the total cost to polluting utilities of com-
plying with mandated emission limitations for sulfur dioxide. 2 18 The
provisions establish national goals for reductions in sulfur dioxide emis-
sions by utility plants and calculate the emissions standard these plants
must attain in order for this goal to be realized. 2 19 By subjecting all
affected plants to the same emissions standard, the reduction require-
ments effectively require larger plants to make the greatest cuts in
pollution.
The provisions authorize the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to allocate annual "allowances," defined as
"limited authorization[s] to emit sulfur dioxide," to all affected utility
units. 220 The EPA Administrator distributes emissions allowances to
utilities, basing allowance computations on the reductions a plant must
make to satisfy the applicable standard at the end of the phase. Under
the system, these facilities can use their allowances, save them for future
use, or trade them. 22 1 If a facility exceeds its allowance limit and has not
215. These programs include the EPA's Emissions Trading Program, Lead Trad-
ing Program, and Acid Rain Allowance Trading Program. See South Coast Air Qual-
ity Management District, Marketable Permits Program, Working Paper #1 (May
1991) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal). See also Jeffrey Taylor, supra
note 214; Richard W. Stevenson, Trying a Market Approach to Smog, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 1992, at C1.
216. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 74 01- 7 6 7 lq (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). See also Larry B.
Parker et al., Clean AirAct Allowance Trading, 21 ENvriL. L. 2021 (1991); Norman W.
Fichthorn, Command-and-Control vs. The Market: The Potential Effects of Other Clean Air Act
Requirements on Acid Rain Compliance, 21 ENVrL. L. 2069 (1991); Warren H. Husband,
New Approaches and New Polluters: The Practical Impact of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 861 (1991).
217. Parker et al., supra note 216, at 2035.
218. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b-7651e (Supp. III 1991). See also Parker et al., supra note
216, at 2022.
219. The provisions seek a 10 million ton reduction in annual sulfur dioxide emis-
sions by the year 2000. Accordingly, the plan is divided into two phases. Phase I
begins on January 1, 1995 and affects 110 of the largest coal-fired utility plants in the
country. For these plants, the amendments mandate an annual emissions standard of
2.5 lbs. sulfur dioxide per million BTUs of fuel consumed, based on the average fuel
consumed during a baseline 1985-1987 period. 42 U.S.C. § 7651c (Supp. III 1991).
Phases II begins on January 1, 2000. At that time the provisions both expand their
coverage to include smaller utility units and reduce the applicable emissions standard
to 1.2 lbs. sulfur dioxide per million Btus. 42 U.S.C. § 7651d (Supp. III 1991).
220. Id. § 7651b(f).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b),(f) (Supp. III 1991). Allowances may not be used retro-
actively, however. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b) (Supp. III 1991).
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purchased allowances from another source, it must pay a sizable fine.2 22
In theory, the allowance trading system will hold costs of complying with
national emission standards to a minimum. Proponents view this mech-
anism as "a model for future pollution control legislation" and advocate
its extension to other environmental problems. 22 3
b. International Application
This author proposes that the CONTRACTING PARTIES establish an
international allowance system, similar in approach to the U.S. Clean Air
Act, to address environmental problems for which standards can not be
successfully negotiated. A well-devised program would provide the
most efficient way of promoting conservation without sacrificing eco-
nomic development. Working within the GATT structure, these coun-
tries should either amend the General Agreement or negotiate a
separate side agreement to set reduction goals for environmentally-
harmful activities and allocate transferable allowances.
In designing an international allowance system, negotiators would
have to resolve such questions as the scope of the program and the man-
ner in which it is overseen and enforced. Most importantly, however,
they would have to devise a formula for the equitable determination of
reduction requirements to ensure acceptance of the plan by both devel-
oped countries and LDCs.
1) Scope
In theory, market-based allowance systems can be employed to regulate
any pollutant or environmentally unsound activity that can be measured
and the cost of its reduction valued. Given the ability of negotiators to
draw upon the U.S. experience, the reduction of acid rain-causing sulfur
dioxide emissions is a logical starting point for an international initia-
tive. The system, however, could also cover emissions of other air pol-
luting and "greenhouse gases" such as carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxide,
clorofluorocarbons, and methane.2 24 Conceivably, as the ability to mea-
sure both production processes and costs of reduction improves, .the
allowance system could be broadened and adapted to address other
environmental concerns such as the protection of endangered plants
and wildlife and the production and disposal of hazardous waste.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 7651j (Supp. III 1991).
223. Parker et al., supra note 216, at 2023. Proponents, for example, seek to
extend allowance trading to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Id.
224. Two economists have already proposed establishing international allowances
and allowance trading for carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel and forest burn-
ing sources. See Daniel J. Dudek & Alice LeBlanc, Preserving Tropical Forests and
Climate: The Role of Trees in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 12-16 (Presented
at the UNCTAD Workshop on Sustainable Development, Rio dejaneiro, Brazil,June
1-4, 1992) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal). See also Rice, supra note
206.
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2) Oversight and Enforcement
The Clean Air Act provisions authorize the EPA to oversee the emis-
sions allowance system. An international system would require similar
oversight. The determination of what organization would oversee the
system depends in large part on the form the multilateral agreement
takes. If the agreement is a side agreeement to the GAIT, negotiators
can either create a new entity or broaden the responsibilities of an
already-existent organization. If, however, the agreement is in the form
of an amendment to the General Agreement, the GATT would be the de
facto overseer of the system. In either situation, it would be advisable
for the parties to take advantage of the collective expertise of existent
international organizations that deal with trade and environmental
issues. The recently activated GAIT Group on Environmental Meas-
ures and International Trade,2 25 for example, could play a role in the
international allowance system. The United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme ("UNEP") has also been actively involved in issues involving
both trade and the environment. Most notably, UNEP played a major
role in the negotiations leading to the Montreal Protocol.
The U.S. Clean Air Act provisions also impose monetary penalties
on utilities that exceed their emissions allowances. An international sys-
tem would likewise need some enforcement mechanism. If the system
were organized under the auspices of the GATT, it could adopt the
traditional GATT rules for the resolution of disputes.2 26
3) Allowance Allocation
As discussed above, the U.S. Clean Air Act model allocates sulfer diox-
ide emission allowances to affected facilities based on the reductions
each facility must make to conform with the predetermined national
standard for sulfur dioxide emissions. In developing such a system on
the international level, however, this author suggests two deviations
from the United States approach to facilitate the program's implementa-
tion and improve its chances for necessary international acceptance.
First, the international system should allocate allowances on a coun-
try-by-country basis, rather than on a facility-by-facility basis as in the
U.S. model. While the Clean Air Act allowance provisions affect 110
utility plants in the first phase and approximately 2000 in the second, 22 7
the number of utilities that an international version would cover would
make management of the system on a facility basis unduly burdensome
and the administrative costs prohibitive. In addition to addressing these
concerns, operating the system on a country, rather than facility, basis
would allow each individual country the opportunity to develop its own
national conservation strategy.
225. See GATT, Trade and the Environment, supra note 1, at 24.
226. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
227. Husband, supra note 216, at 881-82.
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Second, the formula for determining an emissions standard and cal-
culating countries' corresponding emissions allowances must also con-
sider countries' abilities to effect the required reductions. As discussed,
the U.S. legislation propounds one uniform emissions standard and
requires that all affected utility plants meet it without considering their
relative technological base or financial strength. For an international
program to be feasible, however, it must address the arguments of LDCs
that they do not have the financial capabilities to raise their environmen-
tal standards to the same levels as the more developed countries.
As discussed above, the U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions standard is
based on the ratio of sulfur dioxide emitted to the amount of fuel con-
sumed by the plant.228 For the purpose of creating a more equitable
and acceptable formula, this author suggests the infusion of a new varia-
ble into this equation. In addition to emissions and total fuel consumed,
the formula should also consider the relative wealth of the country, so
that countries with greater wealth, all things being equal, must reduce
emissions levels more than relatively poorer countries. One estimate of
national wealth is through the ratio of a country's GNP per capita. As
this variable and a country's wealth are directly proportional, its inclu-
sion in the emissions standard formula can ensure that relatively richer
countries have higher emissions per fuel consumed reduction
requirements.
Including this variable in the emissions standard calculation would
make the proposed international allowance system more equitable for
all parties. While it would assuage the financial-based concerns of
LDCs, the ability to regularly recalculate and readjust reduction require-
ments to account for changes in countries' relative wealths could also
ensure that this equitable solution does not evolve into unfair advan-
tages for LDCs as they develop.
Conclusion
The Panel Report's broad declaration that contracting parties may not
use trade measures to influence environmental policies outside their
borders has put many environmental laws and agreements at risk of
being inconsistent with the GATT. This prospect has sent chills
through environmentalists, who over the past twenty years have success-
fully advocated legislation in the U.S. and multilateral agreements
abroad that utilize the coercive threat of trade sanctions to promote
conservation.
The Panel Report's conclusions pointedly illustrate a serious short-
coming in the GATT as it currently operates. The importance that the
international community has given to conservation in recent years, cou-
pled with the newly-emphasized relationship between trade and the
environment, makes it imperative that the CONTRACTING PARTIES
228. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
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modernize their trading rules to account for these concerns. In seeking
to update the GATT, however, these countries must take care to balance
their desire to protect the environment with the need to preserve the
GATT's liberal trading policies and promote international economic
development.
The active negotiation of environmental standards is an essential
first step toward achieving this goal. Where negotiation of standards
proves unsuccessful, however, the CONTRACTING PARTIES, working
within the GATT, must seek to establish a new framework to address
environmental issues. An international allowance trading system would
address these dual concerns of protecting the environment and promot-
ing economic development. It would provide an efficient means of
reducing environmentally unsound activities. Likewise, its international
acceptance and effectiveness would be secured by employing allocation
formulas that account for the relative wealth of participating countries.
Thomas E. Skilton
